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Abstract. Anonymous communication systems are subject to selective denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks. Selective DoS attacks lower anonymity as they force
paths to be rebuilt multiple times to ensure delivery which increases the opportu-
nity for more attack. In this paper we present a detection algorithm that filters out
compromised communication channels for one of the anonymity networks, Tor.
Our detection algorithm uses two levels of probing to filter out potentially com-
promised tunnels. We perform probabilistic analysis and extensive simulation to
show the robustness of our detection algorithm. We also analyze the overhead of
our detection algorithm and show that we can achieve satisfactory security guar-
antee for reasonable communication overhead (∼ 5% of the total available Tor
bandwidth). Real world experiments reveal that our detection algorithm provides
good defense against selective DoS attack.
Keywords: Anonymity, Tor network, denial of service (DoS) attack.
1 Introduction
Anonymous communication was first introduced in 1981 with Chaum’s seminal paper
on “Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms” [15]. Since
then, many researchers have concentrated on building, analyzing and attacking anony-
mous communication systems like Tor [18], I2P [5] and Freenet [4]. In this paper we
concentrate on Tor [18], one of the most widely used low-latency anonymity networks,
which conceals users’ identities and activities from surveillance and traffic analysis. Tor
provides confidentiality and privacy to users of various types ranging from ordinary in-
dividuals to business personnel, journalists, government employees and even military
personnel. Currently, Tor has over 3000 relays all around the world and it provides
anonymity to hundreds of thousands of people every day [8, 19, 23].
Users’ identity, however, can become exposed when multiple relays are compro-
mised. By default, Tor uses three relays and an attacker who can gain control of the
entry and exit relays is capable of compromising user identity using timing analysis
[22, 28]. Moreover, malicious nodes can perform a selective denial-of-service (DoS)
attack [13, 14] where compromised relays drop packets until a path starting and ending
with a compromised node is built. This increases the probability of such a path being
built and as a result lowers anonymity. Recently, the Dutch ministry of Justice and Se-
curity proposed passing a law which would enable the law enforcement office to launch
any form of attack (i.e., selective DoS could one form of attack) on any system in order
to gather evidence [2]. So some form of mechanism is needed to ensure secure path
construction in the presence of compromised/controlled relays.
Danner et al. [16] showed that it is possible to identify relays mounting selective
DoS using exhaustive probing. The intent is to periodically carry out these probes
and blacklist the misbehaving relays; however, the total number of probes required is
prohibitive—3 times the size of the network (several thousand routers in Tor) , and many
more (typically retrying each probe 10 times) to account for non-malicious failures. So,
their approach seems practical for a centralized design, but we wanted to create a local
mechanism to defend against selective DoS. By using probabilistic inference, we can
make do with orders of magnitude fewer probes and thus our approach can be practical
to be run at each individual client.
Like Danner et al., we make use of probing, but rather than deterministically identi-
fying all relays that are performing selective DoS, we probabilistically check the safety
of particular circuits. In particular, a user builds a number of circuits for future use and
then evaluates their safety by checking whether nodes involved in a circuit will perform
a selective DoS attack. Our tests are based on the assumption that only a minority of Tor
nodes are compromised; this is generally assumed to be necessary to receive reasonable
anonymity protection from Tor, regardless of selective DoS attacks.
Contributions. We make the following contributions: (a) We present a detection
mechanism to filter potentially compromised communication channels. (b) We provide
a probabilistic model of our detection mechanism. Our algorithm ensures that an at-
tacker who performs selective DoS is unsuccessful at compromising tunnels with high
probability. (c) We investigate adaptive attackers who change their strategy specifically
in response to our detection scheme. We find that, depending on the choice of param-
eters, the dominant strategy for such attackers is to not perform selective DoS. (d) We
perform extensive simulation and some real world experiments to show the effective-
ness of our detection mechanism.
Roadmap. Section 2 gives an overview of Tor network along with the threat model.
In Section 3 we formally introduces our algorithm. We provide security analysis of our
detection algorithm in Section 4. To show the effectiveness of our algorithm, we present
simulation and experimental results in Section 5. We describe some of the related works
in Section 6. Finally we conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 Tor Network
Tor [18] is an anonymous communication network that allows users to make TCP con-
nections to Internet sites without revealing their identity to the destination or third-party
observers. We will briefly explain the main components of the operation of Tor as they
are relevant to this work. To initiate an anonymous TCP connection, a Tor user con-
structs a circuit (also known as a tunnel or path) comprised of several Tor relays (also
known as routers). The relays form a forwarding chain that sends traffic from the user
to the destination, and vice versa. Circuits typically involve three relays: the entry, mid-
dle, and exit. The traffic contents are protected by a layered encryption scheme, called
onion routing [27], where each relay peels off a layer while forwarding. As a result, any
individual router cannot reconstruct the whole circuit path and link the source to the
destination.The relays in a circuit are chosen using specific constraints [17]. Each user
selects a small, fixed number of entry relays that are used for all circuits. These relays
are called guard relays [25, 31]; their use is designed to defend from the predecessor
attack [32]. To choose the exit relay, the user picks from among those relays that have
an exit policy compatible with the desired destination. After these constraints, the relays
for each position are chosen randomly, weighted by their bandwidth.
Tor aims to provide low-latency traffic forwarding for its users. As a result, as traffic
is forwarded along the path of a circuit, timing patterns remain discernible, and an
attacker who observes two different relays can use timing analysis to determine whether
they are in fact forwarding the same circuit [22, 28, 30, 33]. As a result, to link a Tor user
to a destination, it suffices to observe the entry and the exit relays of a circuit. Standard
security analysis of Tor [18, 30] shows that if t is the fraction of relays that are observed,
an adversary will be able to violate anonymity on t2 of all of the circuits. Note that, due
to bandwidth-weighted path selection in Tor, t is best thought of as the fraction of total
Tor bandwidth that belongs to relays under observation1. The security of Tor, therefore,
relies on the assumption that a typical adversary will not be able to observe a significant
fraction of Tor relays. For most adversaries, the easiest way to observe relay traffic is
to run their own relays (i.g., using cloud infrastructures like Amazon’s EC2,Rackspace
etc.) or compromise existing ones.
2.2 Selective Denial of Service in Tor
An adversary who controls a Tor relay can perform a number of active attacks to in-
crease the odds of compromise [13, 14]. One approach, which is the focus of this work,
is selective denial of service [14]. A compromised relay that participates in a circuit
can easily check whether both the entry and exit relays are under observation. If this
is not the case, the relay can “break” the circuit by refusing to forward traffic. This
will cause a user to reformulate a new circuit for the connection, giving the adversary
another chance to compromise the circuit. A simple analysis shows that this increases
the overall fraction of compromised circuits to t
2
t2+(1−t)3 > t
2
, because only circuits
with compromised entry and exit relays (t2) or circuits with no compromised relays
((1− t)3) will be functional, and out of those t2 will be compromised. E.g., if t = 0.2,
selective DoS increases the fraction of compromised circuits from 4% to 7.25%. The
use of guard nodes changes the analysis somewhat; compromised guards can amplify
the effect of selective DoS. Bauer et al. [12] showed that deploying a moderate number
of inexpensive2 middle-only relays can boost the effect of selective DoS attack.
1 To be more precise, the correct fraction would be tg · te, where tg and te are the fractions of
the guard and exit bandwidth under observation, respectively. For simplicity of presentation,
we will assume tg = te = tm = t in the rest of the paper.
2 Middle-only nodes do not have to fulfill stronger commitments (e.g., minimum bandwidth,
minimum uptime, legal issues related to exit policies) that guard and exit nodes have to fulfill.
2.3 Threat Model
In our threat model we assume that a small fraction (typically 20%) of the Tor relays are
compromised and compromised relays carry out selective DoS attack. Compromised re-
lays may choose to perform probabilistic dropping, where a compromised relay termi-
nates a certain fraction of all circuits that it cannot compromise. We also discuss other
clever strategies that can be adopted against our detection algorithm in Section 4.5. Fi-
nally, we assume that probes are indistinguishable from real user traffic. We describe
different ways to achieve this in Section 4.6.
3 Our Detection Algorithm
3.1 Overview
Our algorithm is built on the fundamental assumption of the Tor security model that
a relatively small fraction of all relays are compromised. The algorithm works in two
phases and runs periodically. In the first phase, we construct random circuits following
the Tor path construction algorithm and then test their functionality. Under a selective
DoS attack, we expect only two types of circuits to work: honest circuits that contain
no malicious relays, and compromised circuits with compromised entry and exit relays.
In the second phase, we cross-check the circuits against each other by changing their
exit relays (and optionally middle relays too). The prevalence of honest circuits means
that compromised circuits will encounter more failures in the second phase than honest
ones and therefore can be identified. Table 1 summarizes the different parameters used
for our detection algorithm.
Table 1. Parameters Used
Setting Parameter Description
t Fraction of relays compromised
Environmental g Fraction of compromised guards per user
f Random network failure
d Random drop rate by compromised nodes
N # of working Tor circuits created in 1st phase
Tunable K # of probes used per circuit in 2nd phase
Th Threshold for classifying circuit
3.2 First Phase
Tor circuits live for 10 minutes, meaning that we need 6 non-compromised circuits
every hour. So in the first phase of our detection algorithm we iteratively generate a
random Tor circuit (following Tor path specification [17]) and test its functionality by
retrieving a random web file through the circuit. If it fails we discard the circuit and try
a new circuit. We stop when we have N (in Section 4.4 we will show how to calculate
the value of N ) working circuits. If an adversary is carrying out selective DoS attack
then after the first phase we should have a set of circuits of form either CXC or HHH,
where C denotes a compromised relay, H denotes an honest one, and X is a relay of
any type. Note that some circuits of the above forms may still fail for “natural” reasons,
such as an overloaded relay. We discuss the impact of such failures in Section 4.3.
3.3 Second Phase
In the second phase, we examine each of the circuits passing the first phase (we will call
these circuits as potential circuits) by cross-checking them with each other. We evaluate
each potential circuit as follows:
• We randomly pick K(1 ≤ K < N) other circuits (we will call them as candidate
circuits) out of the list of potential circuits.
• For each of the K candidate3 circuits, we change the exit relay of the potential
circuit being evaluated with the exit relay of the candidate circuit (a schematic
description is shown in Figure 1). We then test the functionality/reliability of the
new circuit by performing a test retrieval through it. If, out of these K probes,
Th or more succeed, we consider the evaluated circuit to be honest; otherwise, we
consider it to be compromised. We also propose selecting random middle nodes to
make probes indistinguishable from actual circuits in Section 4.6.
Note that under selective DoS, if we change the exit relay of a compromised circuit
with that of an honest circuit, we will get a circuit where the entry is compromised
and the exit is honest and hence the file retrieval should fail. On the other hand, if
the evaluated and candidate circuits are both honest, or both compromised, the probe
will succeed. We expect more success for an honest circuit, since most of the potential
circuits are honest; we use Th as a threshold for distinguishing between the two circuit
types. At the end of second phase, we will have some number of potentially honest
circuits. This collection of circuits is then used for making real anonymous connections.
Once the pool of circuits is exhausted (typically after one hour if used continuously),
the algorithm is run again to identify new honest circuits (ideally, the algorithm would
be started ahead of time to avoid a delay in circuit availability). The pseudo-code of our
detection algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
C X C
C X C
H H H
.
.
.
Evaluated Type Candidate Type
H H H
C X H
H H C
C X C
H H H
Circuit killed
Circuit killed
Circuit not killed
Circuit not killed
Modifying
exit routers
C: compromised router H: non-compromised router X: either type of router
Fig. 1. Modifying the of exit relay of the evaluatee with that of the candidate circuit to generate
a probing circuit in the second phase.
4 Security Analysis
In this section we will analyze the various security aspects of our detection algorithm
through a probabilistic model.
3 Tor circuits have to follow the constraint that no two relays in the same circuit can be within
the same /16 network, or part of the same operator-specified family. Therefore, when choosing
theK candidate circuits, we pick only those whose exit nodes that don’t violate this constraint.
Algorithm 1 Generating secured Tor circuits
Input: List of stable, valid and running Tor routers. Parameters N , K and Th
Output: List of usable Tor circuits
1st Phase:
i← 1
while i ≤ N do
Create a random Tor circuit according to Tor path specification
Probe the Tor circuits to check its reliability
if probing successful then
i← i+ 1
end if
end while
Consider the set of circuits that pass this phase as P
2nd Phase:
S ← ∅
for each x ∈ P do
Choose K other circuits from P such that they do not violate Tor path constraints
count← 0
for each y ∈ K do
Modify the exit relay of x with that of y
Probe the modified circuit
if probing successful then
count← count + 1
end if
end for
if count ≥ Th then
Classify x as honest circuit
S ← S ∪ x
else
Classify x as compromised circuit
end if
end for
return S
4.1 Considering Compromised Guard Nodes
The selective DoS attack is particularly troubling due to the predecessor attack [32]. To
resist the predecessor attack, Tor introduced a defensive mechanism where each user
picks a small fixed set of guard nodes (usually 3) that are always used as the first node
in a circuit [31]. As a result, users who pick honest guard nodes will be immune to
the predecessor attack. Guard nodes similarly help defend against selective DoS where
users with honest guards will never have their anonymity compromised. However, in
another way, if certain fraction of the guard nodes are compromised it can actually
make the selective DoS attack more powerful. Assume a user has G (typically G = 3)
guard nodes where g fraction of them are compromised. So g ∈ {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1} for
different number of compromised guard nodes.
4.2 False Error Rates
We will first analyze the false-negative and false-positive rates of our algorithm under
selective DoS strategy. For now we assume that the adversary terminates any circuit
which it cannot compromise; we consider other clever strategies in Section 4.5.
We consider an adversary who compromises a bandwidth-weighted fraction t of all
Tor relays. First, we will calculate false-negative (FN) rate–the fraction of compromised
circuits that pass our detection algorithm. The probability of FN depends upon the
number of compromised (CXC ) and honest (HHH ) circuits randomly created in the
first phase. Let, c and h represent the number of circuits of the form CXC and HHH
respectively. Since the adversary is doing selective dropping the only circuits that pass
the first phase of our algorithm are either compromised or honest, so c+ h = N . Then
probability of false negative error can be calculated by the following function:
Pr(FN ) =
N∑
c=0
Pr(C = c) Pr(FN |C = c,H = N − c) (1)
where C and H are the numbers of compromised and honest circuits after phase 1,
respectively. Note that, likewise, for false-positive errors (fraction of honest circuits
falsely discarded):
Pr(FP) =
N∑
c=0
Pr(C = c) Pr(FP |C = c,H = N − c) (2)
To calculate the individual probabilities in (1), we can approximate C by the Binomial
distribution B(N, gt
gt+(1−g)(1−t)2 ) and since c+ h = N , Pr(H = N − c|C = c) = 1.
This calculation assumes that relays are sampled with replacement and that family and
/16 subnet constraints are ignored, but given the large number of Tor relays, this results
in minimal approximation error.
A false-negative error occurs when a compromised circuit is paired with at least
Th other compromised candidate circuits. Since these circuits are sampled without re-
placement, we can calculate Pr(FN |C = c,H = N − c) using a hypergeometric
distribution:
Pr(FN |C = c,H = N − c) =
K′∑
i=Th′
(
c−1
i
)(
N−c
K′−i
)
(
N−1
K′
) (3)
where K ′ = min(K,N − 1) and Th′ = min(Th,K ′). Similarly, a false-positive error
occurs when an honest circuit is paired with fewer than Th honest candidate circuits:
Pr(FP |C = c,H = N − c) =
Th′−1∑
i=0
(
N−c−1
i
)(
c
K′−i
)
(
N−1
K′
) (4)
We also analyze the impact of transient network failures on both FN and FP rates
on the next section.
4.3 Dealing with Transient Network Failures
Regardless of whether selective DoS is being performed or not, circuit failures can and
will happen in Tor. This may be caused by connectivity errors in the network, or, more
likely, congestion at or crash of the Tor relay. In any network infrastructure there is
always some network failure. Since, network failure can directly influence the success
rate of our probing, it can affect both FN and FP rates. So equation (1) needs to be
updated. After phase 1, we have to consider that a fraction of both CXC and HHH
circuits fail. Lets assume that out of the C, CXC and H , HHH circuits, C′ and H ′
respectively survive random network failure. Then Pr(FN) can be computed using
equation (5). Terms Pr(C′ = c′|C = c) and Pr(H = h′|H = N − c) can be approx-
imated by binomial distributions B(c, c′, 1 − f) and B(N − c, h′, 1 − f) respectively
(where f denotes random failure rate). So after considering random network failure we
have c′ compromised and h′ honest circuits during the second phase. We also have to
consider failures in the second phase, where certain fraction of the modified circuits
will fail to retrieve a file through the network. This will cause equation (3) and (4) to be
modified to equations (6) and (7). In equations (6) and (7), K ′ = min(K, c′ + h′ − 1)
and Th′ = min(Th,K ′).
Pr(FN) =
N∑
c=0
Pr(C = c)
[
c∑
c′=0
Pr(C′ = c′|C = c) Pr(FN |C′ = c′, C = c)
]
=
N∑
c=0
Pr(C = c)
[
c∑
c′=0
Pr(C′ = c′|C = c)
[
N−c∑
h′=0
Pr(H ′ = h′|H = N − c)
· Pr(FN |C = c, C′ = c′, H = N − c,H ′ = h′)
]]
(5)
Pr(FN |C′ = c′, H ′ = h′) =
K′∑
i=Th′
(
c′−1
i
)(
h′
K′−i
)
(
c′+h′−1
K′
) i∑
j=Th′
B(i, j, 1− f) (6)
Pr(FP |C′ = c′, H ′ = h′) = 1−
K′∑
i=Th′
(
h′−1
i
)(
c′
K′−i
)
(
c′+h′−1
K′
) i∑
j=Th′
B(i, j, 1− f) (7)
4.4 Tuning Parameters
Security vs Overhead: Our detection algorithm has three tunable parameters (N,K, Th)
(see Table 1 for description). In this section we introduce two evaluation metrics: secu-
rity (ψ) and overhead (η). We then tuneK and Th in terms of these evaluation metrics.
We define security as the probability of not choosing a compromised circuit for actual
usage and overhead as the expected number of probes required for each usable circuit
(by usable circuits we refer to the circuits that are actually used by a client). We define
ψ and η using the following functions (both of these metrics are approximations):
ψ = 1−
gt× Pr(FN)
gt× Pr(FN) + (1− g)(1− t)2 × (1− Pr(FP ))
(8)
η =
1 +
[
gt+ (1 − g)(1− t)2
]
×K
gt× Pr(FN) + (1− g)(1− t)2 × (1− Pr(FP ))
(9)
Detailed derivations of the metrics are given in Appendix B. Figure 2, shows the distri-
bution of (K,Th) for different values of ψ and η. Since we are interested in attaining
higher security guarantee at a lower overhead, we cap the overhead axis to 25 probes
per usable circuit. We can see that as K increases the overhead per usable circuit also
increases which is expected. On the other hand an increase in Th (i.e., as it approaches
K) results in an increase in FP which causes overhead to rise. So typically we want to
choose a (K,Th) pair that achieves reasonable security guarantee and at the same time
induces acceptable overhead. Figure 2 also highlights the fact that as g increases the
security metric ψ decreases. From figure 2 we see that values such as (K,Th) = (3, 2)
achieves acceptable outcome in terms of both security and overhead. We also discuss
probabilistic bounding of our parameters in Appendix C and show an alternative tuning
process where we use the crossover point of FN and FP to determine the value of
(K,Th) pair in Appendix D.
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Fig. 2. Tuning parameters (K,Th) against security metric ψ and communication overhead η
for different fraction of compromised guards (per user). Results for g = 1/3, 2/3 are more
interesting than the results for g = 0, 1 as they are trivial.
4.5 Analyzing Other Attack Strategies
So far we have assumed that the adversary is doing selective DoS, i.e., dropping any
communication which it cannot compromise. However, it is possible for the adver-
sary to do probabilistic dropping, where a compromised router terminates a certain
fraction of all circuits that it cannot compromise. Doing so could potentially increase
an adversaries chance of passing the second phase. Lets analyze how probabilistic
dropping affects our detection algorithm. Any circuit formation must belong to the
set {HHH,HHC,HCH,CHH,CCH,CHC,HCC,CCC}. Now circuits of forms
{HHH,CHC,CCC} are never terminated (ignoring network failure), but under se-
lective DoS all other forms of circuits are always dropped. However, if the adversary
was not to kill any circuit then all forms of circuits would survive the first phase and a
compromised circuit would have a wider variety of circuits to chose from in the second
phase. Any circuit belonging to the set {HHC,CHC,CCC,HCC} would benefit a
compromised circuit in the second phase. Under selective DoS the probability of select-
ing another circuit with compromised exit router is gt
gt+(1−g)(1−t)2 . On the other hand
with d% drop rate this probability becomes:
gt+ [(1− g)(1− t)t+ (1− g)t2](1 − d)
(1− g)(1− t)2 + gt+ [1− (1 − g)(1− t)2 − gt](1− d)
(10)
So a seemingly better strategy against our detection algorithm would be to allow all
circuits belonging to the set {HHC,CHC,CCC,HCC} to always go through and
drop other forms of circuits at rate d. We will call this strategy as shrewd strategy for
future reference. For the shrewd strategy the probability of selecting a candidate with
compromised exit router becomes: t(1−g)(1−t)2+t+[1−(1−g)(1−t)2−t](1−d)
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Fig. 3. Probability of selecting candidate circuits (in the second phase) with compromised exit
relay for different drop rates d. Shrewd strategy seems to be a better choice for an adversary.
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Fig. 4. Fraction of non-compromised circuits that forward traffic under both strategies for differ-
ent drops rate d. Shrewd strategy seems to be more costly than the simple strategy.
Figure 3 highlights the above calculated probability for different drop rates. As we
can see from figure 3, at higher drop rate the probability of success in the second phase
is significantly higher for the shrewd strategy compared to the simple strategy. Thus,
with probabilistic dropping an adversary can increase its chance of bypassing our de-
tection algorithm; however that comes at the cost of forwarding traffic through non-
compromised circuits (circuits belonging to the set {HHC,HCH,CHH,CCH,HCC}
are termed as non-compromised) which in turn can help honest circuits crossover the
threshold more readily. We can calculated the probability of forwarding traffic through
non-compromised circuits using the following equation:[
1− t− (1− g)(1− t)2
]
(1 − d) + (1− g)t
[1− t− (1− g)(1− t)2] (1− d) + t+ (1 − g)(1− t)2
(11)
Figure 4 shows the fraction of non-compromised circuits used in forwarding traffic.
We can see from figure 4 that shrewd strategy forwards more traffic through non-
compromised circuits compared to the simple strategy. So the shrewd strategy also helps
honest circuits to crossover the threshold, Th .
4.6 Masking Probes
Note that it is important that compromised relays should not be able to distinguish be-
tween probes and real requests. Otherwise the attacker can let probes go through and
launch selective DoS on actual traffic. To mask probes from actual user traffic we pro-
pose downloading popular web pages listed by Alexa [6]. This will make it harder for
compromised exits to distinguish probes from actual traffic. Alternatively, we could
randomize our probes by performing automated random web searches [20] and down-
loading the resulting pages. Note that recent work shows that random web searches can
be distinguished from real ones [26]; however, this relies on building statistical pro-
files of search queries. In our case, every download is not linkable (at least for circuits
that the adversary can’t compromise, which are the ones that matter!) and thus such
techniques are not applicable.
To eliminate any form of probing trace we can randomly choose K non-repetitive
middle nodes along with theK candidate circuits. Doing so will have negligible impact
on honest circuits because the probability of selecting an honest middle node after first
phase is: (1−t)
3+t2(1−t)
(1−t)3+t2 (for t = 0.2 this probability is ≈ 0.99). Moreover, to remove
temporal trace we can randomize the time at which we execute our algorithm.
Now although we take different measures to make probes indistinguishable from
real traffic. A strong adversary may come up with some form of timing analysis to
distinguish probes from real traffic. It should be noted that making probes indistin-
guishable from real traffic is a hard research problem and a solution to this problem
would be beneficial to many other existing security enhancing schemes. For example
Tor’s Bandwidth-Measuring Directory Authorities [1] probe relays to compare their ac-
tual observed bandwidth with their advertised bandwidth. So in this case it is critical
that probes are indistinguishable from user traffic, otherwise compromised relays can
report false bandwidth to these Directory Authorities and increase their chance of being
selected during actual usage.
5 Experimental Evaluation
5.1 Simulation Results
We implemented a simulator in C++ that emulates the basic functionality of Tor circuit
construction and selective DoS attack. We collected real Tor node information from [11]
and randomly tagged 20% (t = 0.2) of the bandwidth to be controlled by a compro-
mised entity. We vary g (0 ≤ g ≤ 1) and d (0 ≤ d ≤ 1) to analyze the robustness and
effectiveness of our detection algorithm. Here, 100% drop rate refers to selective DoS
and 0% drop means no dropping at all. In the following evaluations we give more em-
phasis to g = 1/3, 2/3 (i.e., 1 or 2 of the 3 guards is/are compromised), since g = 0, 1
are trivial scenarios. We set K = 3 and Th = 2 in most of the simulations. To approxi-
mate the failure rate present in the current Tor network we use the TorFlow project [10]
and set f = 0.23 in all our simulations (details are given in Appendix A). All simulation
results are averaged over 100 runs (along with their 95% confidence interval).
Robustness: First, we will look at the robustness of our detection algorithm in filter-
ing out compromised circuits. For this purpose we go through a series of evaluations.
First, we investigate the FN and FP of our detection algorithm. Figure 5 shows the
probability of FN and FP against different drop rates, d. From the figure we see that
as drop rate d increases, FN decreases for 0 ≤ g ≤ 2/3. The main reason behind the
decrease of FN lies on the fact that as compromised nodes start to perform aggressive
dropping, the pool of available circuits in the first phase quickly converges to the set
{CXC,HHH}. This in turn lowers a compromised circuit’s chance of selecting other
compromised candidate circuits in the second phase of our detection algorithm as hon-
est circuits dominate over compromised circuits for t = 0.2. For g = 1, FN initially
decreases until d = 0.6; but for larger drop rates (d > 0.6) FN increases because with
g = 1 the set of available circuits in the first phase conform to the set {CHC,CCC}
which increases a compromised circuit’s chance of crossing the threshold of our detec-
tion algorithm.FP tends to increase as the drop rate d increases. The reason behind this
is that as d rises the probability of selecting candidate circuits of form CXC increases
which makes it harder for honest circuits to cross the threshold, Th .
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Fig. 5. Probability of FN and FP for different drop rates d. In general, FN decreases as d rises
while FP increases as d rises.
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Fig. 6. Probability of selecting compromised circuits Pr(CXC) and honest circuits Pr(HHH)
for different drop rates d. We see that Pr(CXC) decreases while Pr(HHH) increases as d rises
which signifies the robustness of our detection algorithm against selective DoS attack.
Next, we measure the probabilities of selecting compromised and honest circuits
once we have filtered the potential compromised circuits. We compute these probabili-
ties using the following equations:
Pr(CXC) =
n(CXC)
n(HHH) + n(CXC) + (1− d)n(Others)
(12)
Pr(HHH) =
n(HHH)
n(HHH) + n(CXC) + (1− d)n(Others)
(13)
where Pr(Others) represents the probability of selecting circuits other than CXC or
HHH . Figure 6 shows the measured probabilities. We can see that Pr(CXC) de-
creases while Pr(HHH) increases as drop rate d increases. In the figure, we also high-
light the corresponding probabilities for conventional Tor network (indicated by the
dashed lines). We see a significant improvement in filtering out compromised circuits
compared to the conventional Tor network (the only exception is when g = 1 which
is already a hopeless scenario). So from these results we can say that our detection
algorithm provides higher level of security assurance compared to conventional Tor.
Now, we compare the shrewd strategy (as described in Section 4.5) with the simple
strategy. In section 4.5 we saw that under shrewd strategy FN increases while FP
decreases as drop rate d increases. To better understand the comparison between the
two strategies we redefined the security metric defined in equation (8) as:
ψ = 1−
Pr(CXC)
Pr(CXC) + Pr(HHH) + (1 − d) Pr(Others)
(14)
This redefined metric will help us determine whether the change in Pr(CXC) domi-
nates over the change in Pr(HHH) for the shrewd strategy (as both probabilities in-
crease for the shrewd strategy). Figure 7 plots the redefined metric ψ against drop rate
d. As we can see from the figure both strategies have similar outcome. This means that
the adversary really does not gain anything by adopting the shrewd strategy.
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Fig. 7. Comparing simple strategy against shrewd strategy for different probabilities.
Security vs Overhead Tradeoff: In this section we explore the impact the pair (K,Th)
has on the different metrics we have evaluated so far. We evaluate the security guaran-
tee (i.e., we calculate Pr(CXC)) and overhead per usable circuit for different values of
(K,Th) pair. We found that the following effect dominates: lower values ofK improve
overall overhead (shown in figure 8) while higher values of Th increase the security
guarantee of the detection algorithm (shown in figure 8). Thus, there exists a tradeoff
between the obtainable security guarantee and the required bandwidth overhead.
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Fig. 8. Average security guarantee(in terms of selecting a compromised circuits) and overhead
per usable circuit for different drop rates d. As we increase Th the security guarantees improve
but overhead per usable circuit increases.
5.2 Real World Experiment
We carried out our experiment by introducing our own relays into the Tor network, all of
which acted as compromised nodes. For this purpose we used 11 Emulab [3] machines,
10 of which were configured to act as Tor relays with a minimum bandwidth capacity of
20Kbps. Note that all our nodes belonged to the same /16 subnet, meaning that no user
would (by default) choose two of our nodes in the same circuit. Moreover, to prevent
other users from using our nodes as exit nodes, we configured our relays with a fixed
exit policy (allowing connection to only specific destinations). All these measures were
taken to reduce the non-benevolent impact of our relays on the Tor network.
For implementing selective DoS we take an approach similar to the one described
by Bauer et al. [13]. Here, out of the 11 machines we run Tor protocol on 10 of them
and used the remaining machine as a server for gathering timing information about
which router is communicating with whom at what time. The sever performs timing
analysis and informs the other 10 machines when to drop communication to perform
selective DoS (we modified Tor source code version-tor-0.2.2.35). We implemented our
detection algorithm in the client side in Python (we used the open source Python library
of Tor Control Port (TorCtl.py)[7]).
Robustness: In our experiments we first query the Tor directory server to retrieve a
list of all available Tor routers and then filter this list by considering only those routers
which are flagged as running, stable and valid, because we want our routers to be alive
and running during our experiments. We selected 40 Tor nodes (3 guards, 19 exits and
18 relays) at random with probability proportional to their bandwidth and added our
own 10 nodes to this set to get a total of 50 nodes. Then we ran our experiments on
this small set of Tor nodes where nodes are selected randomly. This choice results in
about 20% of the nodes being compromised. To emulate user traffic/usage, we retrieve
random web files 100–300 KB in size. We set K = 3,Th = 2 for our experiments.
Table 2 summarizes our findings.
Table 2. Experimental results from the real Tor network
g FN FP ψ
Security in
Current Tor
0 0.0 0.0664 1.0 1.0
1/3 0.0 0.178 1.0 0.867
2/3 0.133 0.283 0.843 0.612
1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
From table 2 we see that as g increases the security assurance provided by both our
approach and the conventional Tor network go down. However, for g = 1/3, 2/3 our
approach shows significant improvement in filtering out compromised circuits. Thus we
can say that our detection algorithm provides strong robustness even when two guards
out of the three guard nodes are compromised.
Overhead: Let us now estimate what kind of bandwidth overhead our mechanism
would inflict on the real Tor network. From figure 8 we see that on average a sin-
gle usable circuit would require approximately 4 probes. Since we are proposing to
use random popular web sites as probing destinations we can approximate the average
probe size to be 300KB [29]. Moreover, since users requires 6 usable circuits every
one hour we set the time interval to 3600 seconds. From these values we calculate the
bandwidth required per usable circuit to be 3×300×43600 = 1KB/s. So for 6 usable circuits
a user would consume 6KB/s of bandwidth. Now, Tor’s bandwidth capacity was found
to be 3,359,120 KB/s [8] during the month of September, 2012. If we allow 5% of the
bandwidth to be used for our detection algorithm then we can support approximately
28,000 simultaneous users per hour (i.e.,≈ 672, 000 users daily which is > 619, 696,
the peak daily Tor users for Oct, 2012 [8]). By simultaneous users we refer to users that
run our algorithm exactly at the same time. However, we could lower our bandwidth re-
quirement by lowering the individual probe size (potentially we could use smaller size
popular web pages as probe destinations). We could also use a client’s circuit usage his-
tory to construct the initial set of working circuits (in our model this is represented by
N ). Alternatively, we could spread out our filtering scheme over a longer time frame.
6 Related Work
Borisov et al. [14] first showed that carrying out selective DoS could benefit an adver-
sary to increase its chance of compromising anonymity for both high and low-latency
anonymous communication systems like Hydra-Onion [21], Cashmere [34] and Salsa
[24]. In fact, it was pointed out that with 20% compromised nodes in Salsa, the selec-
tive DoS attack results in 19.14% compromised tunnels compared to the conventional
security analysis of 6.82% compromised tunnels.
Later on Danner et al. [16] proposed a detection algorithm for selective DoS attack
on Tor. Their algorithm basically probes each individual Tor node in the network and
they prove that this requiresO(n) probes to detect all compromised nodes in the Tor net-
work comprising of n participants. For Tor circuits of length 3 their algorithm requires
3n probes; however to handle transient network failures they proposed to repeat each
probe l number of times. They define an lower bound of l; under conventional analysis a
value of 10 for l was shown to be sufficient. So this means for a Tor network with 3000
nodes, it would require roughly 90, 000 probes to identify all compromised nodes in the
network. However, their algorithm assumes that compromised nodes have a fixed char-
acteristic of always dropping non-compromised circuits. They do not consider complex
attack strategies whether compromised nodes may perform random dropping. More-
over, they provide no analysis of the overhead involved in performing these probes.
Clearly, this approach will not scale well if a large number of users start to probe Tor
nodes simultaneously. We take a different approach where a user tries to accumulate
a set of non-compromised working circuits (for future usage) instead of classifying all
Tor nodes as either compromised or non-compromised. We also analyze different types
of complex attack strategies against our detection algorithm.
Recently (on 16 Oct, 2012), Mike Perry (Torbutton and Tor Performance Developer)
proposed a client-side accounting mechanism that tracks the circuit failure rate for each
of the client’s guards [9]. The goal is to avoid malicious guard nodes that deliberately
fail circuits extending to non-colluding exit nodes. We take a more proactive approach
to finding malicious circuits through probing instead of tracking actual circuit usage.
7 Conclusion
Anonymous communication systems like Tor are vulnerable to selective denial of ser-
vice attack which considerably lowers anonymity. Such attacks however, can be de-
tected through probing. Our detection algorithm probes communication channels to fil-
ter out potentially compromised ones with high probability. We also show that adaptive
adversaries who choose to deny service probabilistically do not benefit from adopting
such strategy. Our experimental results demonstrate that our detection algorithm can
effectively defend users against selective DoS attack.
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Appendix
A Approximating Failure Rate in the Tor Network
To approximate the failure rate present in the current Tor network we use the TorFlow
project [10]. TorFlow project measures the performance of Tor network by creating Tor
circuits and recording statistical data such as circuit construction time, circuit failure
rates and stream failure rate. We are interested in the circuit failure rate as it directly
impacts the false ratings of our detection algorithm. So for our purpose we run the
buildtime.py [10] python script to generate 10,000 Tor circuits and record their failure
rate. We ran the script 10 times and found the average failure rate to be approximately
23%. We therefore set f = 0.23 in our simulations.
B Security and Overhead Metric
In this section we will show the step by step derivation of the security and overhead
metrics defined in Section 4.4. Now we defined our security metric ψ as the probability
of not selecting a compromised circuit after running our filtering algorithm. Lets define
n(CXC) and n(HHH) as the number of compromised and honest circuits passing the
first phase of our detection algorithm.
n(CXC) = N ×
gt
gt+ (1− g)(1− t)2
, n(HHH) = N ×
(1 − g)(1− t)2
gt+ (1 − g)(1− t)2
Given the number of compromised and honest circuits that pass the first phase we can
compute their corresponding fractions that pass the second phase using our false nega-
tive and false positive rates. We can then derive ψ using the following equation:
ψ = 1−
n(CXC)× Pr(FN)
n(CXC)× Pr(FN) + n(HHH)× [1− Pr(FP )]
= 1−
gt× Pr(FN)
gt× Pr(FN) + (1− g)(1− t)2 × [1− Pr(FP )]
(15)
To compute the overhead per usable circuit we first need to determine the total
number of probes (n(Probes)) required by our detection algorithm. We then compute
the overhead metric η by dividing n(Probes) by the total number of usable circuits.
n(Probes) =
N
gt+ (1− g)(1 − t)2
+N ×K
η =
n(Probes)
n(CXC)× Pr(FN) + n(HHH)× [1− Pr(FP )]
=
1 +
[
gt+ (1− g)(1− t)2
]
×K
gt× Pr(FN) + (1 − g)(1− t)2 × [1− Pr(FP )]
(16)
C Probabilistic Bounding of Parameters
We will use probabilistic expectation analysis to determine what values (or ranges) to
use for them. By default, Tor creates a new circuit every 10 minutes and since our
algorithm is rerun every one hour, 6 honest circuits are required by a user in an one
hour period. So we can calculate the value ofN from this condition using the following
function N =
⌈
6× gt+(1−g)(1−t)
2
(1−g)(1−t)2
⌉
So N varies as g varies. For g = 1, N tends to
infinity which is understandable because with all guards being compromised a user can
never construct an honest circuit. In other words, if all the guards are compromised it’s
pointless to use any filtering technique. Now, since a user does not know what fraction
of its guards are compromised we consider the worst redeemable scenario where two
of the guards are compromised (i.e., g = 2/3, as g = 1 is a hopeless scenario). In such
case, we can cap N to the fixed value of 10 using the above equation.
Now, lets look at how to set the value of parameters K and Th . For concreteness,
we will consider t = 0.2 (typically this value is assumed in any Tor security model). In
the presence of selective DoS, the expected number of honest and compromised circuits
passing the first phase of our detection algorithm are: n(HHH) = N × (1−g)(1−t)
2
gt+(1−g)(1−t)2
and n(CXC) = N × gt
gt+(1−g)(1−t)2 respectively. For t = 0.2, n(CXC) < n(HHH)
except for g = 1. So, from an honest circuit’s point of view if we were to choose
K = m · n(CXC) (where m ∈ ℜ,m > 0) probes in the 2nd phase then in the worst
case we would have n(CXC) out of the K candidate circuits of form CXC . In order
to have at least 50% of the probes to be successful, the following condition must be
met: 2n(CXC) < m · n(CXC) < N ⇒ 2 < m < 1 + (1−g)(1−t)
2
gt
. Now, the best
possible outcome that a compromised circuit can achieve is: n(CXC) − 1 successful
probes out of K probes. On the other hand, the worst possible outcome for an honest
circuit is (m − 1) × n(CXC) successful probes out of K probes. With m > 2, it is
clear that (m − 1) × n(CXC) > n(CXC). The value of Th should, therefore, lie in
the range of (m− 1)× n(CXC) ≤ Th < K . Thus, given the value of t, g and N we
can determine the range of K and Th .
D Tuning K and Th using crossover points between FN and FP
Parameter Th impacts both FN and FP rating for a given K value. If we increase
Th (for a given K) it lowers FN while it increases FP . Figure 9(a) shows the prob-
ability of FN and FP against threshold Th for the parametric setting (t, g, f, d) =
(0.2, 1/3, 0.23, 1) with K = 10. The y-axis is given in log-scale. As we can see from
the figure the FN and FP crossover and this crossover point can be used to determine
the value of Th to use. In this case (for K = 10), we see that Th can be set to either 5
or 6 (which conforms with the range of 1 ≤ Th < K , computed in Appendix C). We
can then use this crossover points to compute the pair (K,Th). Figure 9(b) also shows
the corresponding values of K and Th at the crossover points. This can be used to tune
the value of K and Th .
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Fig. 9. (a) Computing the value of Th at which FN and FP crossover. We can see that as Th
increases FP goes up while FN goes down. (b) Using this crossover point we can determine the
value of Th for a given K.
